



Critique of Orientalism in Contemporary One of the Gulf Province

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Abstract

The subject of Oriental studies primarily focuses on history and heritage. Orientalists have followed various methodologies in their readings of history, and most of these methodologies have had an ideological character that works to reinforce the idea of European centrality. Based on this, several thinkers have worked on studying and analyzing these methodologies to uncover the ideological objectives employed in addressing issues in history. One great personality is considered one of the prominent contemporary Gulf country intellectuals who criticized Orientalist methodologies. He began his critique of Orientalism by engaging in a debate with Orientalists regarding their methodologies used in critiquing Orientalism. His critique was methodological rather than ideological, as he sought to highlight the flaws and biases in Orientalist methodologies and analyze them with rigorous scientific methodology. In general, towards Oriental studies was a methodological critique aimed at rectifying the shortcomings in the methodologies used in studying history and heritage. It was not an ideological critique aimed at tarnishing the image of Orientalists or proving the superiority of culture over European culture.

Introduction

Firstly: Environment and Upbringing of great person

The Person considered one of the most important contemporary intellectuals due to his intellectual achievements, which have attracted the attention of many youth and elites. He has influenced numerous individuals from various Gulf countries, and his works have extended beyond the Arab world to Europe and the United States. This is attributed to his writings characterized by visionary enthusiasm, high theoretical capacity, and methodological rigor. He possesses extensive knowledge of Western thought and a comprehensive understanding of its details and principles.

He was born in the city of Azemmour, located on the Atlantic coast of Morocco, in 1933. He completed his education in schools established by the French in Morocco, which aimed to graduate a group of young individuals for employment in French protection services. Later, He joined Rabat and continued his studies there. In 1953, he traveled to France to study political science and was subsequently appointed as the director of a national school. However, after Morocco gained independence in 1956, he stepped down from his administrative position due to being considered a

foreigner. He then focused all his attention on studying history and studies [1].

One of the most important works is "Contemporary Arab Ideology," which was initially published in 1967 in French and later translated. He also published a book in French titled "The Crisis of Arab Intellectuals" in 1970, which was later printed in Arabic as "Arabs and Historical Thought" in 1973. His publications continued with works such as "The Concept of Ideology" in 1980, "The Concept of Freedom" in 1981, "The Concept of the State" in 1981, "The Concept of History" in 1992, and "The Concept of Reason" in 1996. He also published two books in French: ", Modernity, and Liberalism" in 1997 and " and History" in 1999.

Secondly: Methodological Foundations

He paid great attention to the issue of methodology when approaching Arab intellectual issues and problems. His approach was epistemological rather than ontological. His methodology is based on two fundamental aspects: the historical aspect, which examines the use of historical materials, particularly the concept of ideology, and the foundational aspect, which is influenced by foundational philosophers such as Descartes, Kant, Hegel, and Marx. This is evident in a series of concepts he explores,



including ideology, reason, freedom, history, and the state.

His methodology in historical studies and cultural analyses focuses on two interrelated steps: the moment of deconstruction and analysis, and the moment of synthesis. It follows a cyclical approach where each step leads to the other, without the possibility of separating them in the result. The formative methodology studies the emergence of intellectual systems such as schools, doctrines, and movements, relying primarily on the material stored in the books of various classes. On the other hand, the deconstructive methodology starts from the composed and coordinated intellectual system to break it down into parts and return each part to its origin. The former methodology is a branch of the history of ideas with well-established principles, while the latter shares its cognitive foundations with linguistics and logic. He points out that any study that does not integrate both methodologies fail to satisfy specialists [2-4].

He considers the issue of methodology in scientific studies not merely a formal matter but rather a matter of references, discussions, and the systematic exchange of ideas. He criticizes the idea that there is no conflict in methodology and that differences are only a matter of opinion. He points out that this view was true in the past when there was agreement on common sense, but today opinions differ even in the methodology itself, and the differences in methodology represent differences in common sense.

He explains that contemporary scholars often start with an idea without understanding its components and apply this idea to a subject without investigating beforehand whether it can withstand scrutiny. With this approach, the scholar remains within the realm of subjectivity, revealing personal concerns more than uncovering reality. Even if the relied-upon documents are accurate and all interpretations are possible, a study based on this approach remains on the margins of realism and does not reveal the complete truth.

He urges for attention to be given to methodology and its systematic and scientific analysis. He emphasizes the need to study subjects comprehensively and from multiple perspectives in order to achieve a better understanding of reality and our societies [5]

Therefore, He emphasizes that methodology represents the foundation of any scientific work, and it cannot be bypassed based on a scientific tendency claiming

absolute objectivity. Here, the distinction between methodologies and doctrines becomes clear, as they are necessary in their diversity for the development and continuity of human thought.

In the methodology is the "logic of modern thought" after it separated from ancient thought. Those who claim that excessive talk about methodology prevents its application and utilization overlook the fact that the hallmark of modern thought is that it turns every issue into an epistemological question. There is no modern thought alongside criticism; rather, all modern thought is criticism [6-7].

His interest in the issue of methodology, he classifies it as one of the problems facing that require solutions. He wonders about the method through which modern can achieve equality with others who excel in certain fields, and who often exploit this superiority to subjugate and control them. He points out that the search for a sound methodology that leads to the effectiveness of every activity is, in fact, a search into the essence of the human mind. It relates to finding an effective method to achieve independence, progress, and development in various fields. This, in itself, requires a deep understanding of the human mind and how it works and interacts with the surrounding reality.

He questions whether there is a common denominator among human beings, especially upon which a sound methodology that leads to progress and development can be developed. If the answer is yes, it means that the future of humanity is one, and this anticipated unity renders all the importance of issues revolving around self and history insignificant. It imposes on us a comprehensive and multidimensional thinking to achieve progress, development, and independence [8].

Accordingly to continuous interest in the issue of methodology is a methodical interest. He seeks to create an intellectual and practical methodology aimed at understanding oneself and understanding others, thus integrating with the universal civilization available to all of humanity. This is based on the recognition that the achievements of civilization are universal human accomplishments. Therefore, this methodology does not separate the intellectual aspect from the practical aspect [9].

On the level of methodology, he was influenced by the German school and adopted the historical methodology. This methodology represents a reaction against positivist



history and the adoption of the natural sciences' methodology by humanists. This trend emerged in Germany in the late 19th century and then spread to include Italy, Britain, and Spain. Its influence on France was limited and reached it later.

The historical historian relies on documentary sources that allow direct access to the intentions of the historical actor (memoirs, newspapers, reports, testimonies). However, they do not approach these sources with a sanctified perspective, unlike the positivist historian. What matters most to the historical historian is the practice of interpretation and the search for hidden meanings, as well as rediscovering the world in which the historical actor lived, which is the subject of the study. This is done through the use of intellectual capacity that enables them to bring the past to life in its own terms [10].

Thirdly: The Critique of Orientalist Approaches

The great person opened his criticism of Orientalism by revealing the ideological backgrounds of colonial writing methodology about the history of Morocco. He emphasized that the works of Orientalists were filled with colonial judgments and preconceived ideas aimed at justifying colonization and presenting it as a beneficial civilization for the colonizers. In this regard, he mentions, "Colonial authorship was full of negative judgments based on preconceived concepts that were not organically linked to the facts of Moroccan history." Especially since the historical works produced about the history of Morocco in contemporary times were not the work of Moroccan or Arab researchers, but mostly the work of researchers during the colonial period who were associated with colonial authority and its interests in Morocco. He describes these researchers who wrote the history of Morocco as amateur researchers without geographical or historical qualifications. They were employees claiming knowledge, military personnel feigning culture, and art historians surpassing their expertise. Some of them lacked linguistic training or were linguists without historical qualifications. They referred to each other, weaving a web of conspiracy to impose distant assumptions as established facts [11-13]. Since criticizing colonial writing and uncovering its ideological purposes is not enough, as these writings were able, thanks to the conditions provided to researchers, to gather information that a Moroccan

researcher today cannot easily surpass. Through this, those writings were able to establish themselves as primary sources in the history of Morocco and in analyzing Moroccan society in general. Nevertheless, he emphasizes the necessity of detailed and critical reading of all historical writings written during that colonial period and confronting them. Neglecting them may affect researchers who thirst for knowledge and are not adequately prepared to make personal judgments. The hypotheses presented in those writings are considered partial and temporary, which may become obsolete for a researcher who is not prepared with solid and final facts. Based on this perspective, He calls for the necessity of writing the history of Morocco by Moroccan researchers, by presenting a Moroccan perspective on the history of Morocco, even if it does not bring any new revelations and is limited to new interpretations of events and facts. In this way, criticism of Orientalism has become an essential part of the work, and his efforts have contributed to reevaluating the colonial view of Moroccan history and the world in general [14-15].

This approach is found in the views, who believe that ideological criticism, although necessary, is not sufficient. The goal of highlighting these ideological backgrounds is not an absolute rejection of this scientific production. Instead, sociology should engage with colonial sociology by studying its conditions, objectives, and fundamental concepts, and examining their connection to those conditions and objectives. He emphasize the importance of not completely abandoning the cultural heritage of colonial writings. They argue that Moroccan social sciences are not self-qualified to take such an action because they have not been able to approach the topics addressed by colonial social sciences from a new perspective that goes beyond ideological backgrounds. Another reason is that this stance is not epistemologically valid, as the research conducted in colonial social sciences was carried out by qualified researchers trained for such research. Despite their general ideological bias, these studies contain a wealth of data and specific facts that contemporary social research cannot simply overlook by criticizing their general ideological orientation [16-17].

He affirms the importance of critiquing Orientalism but points out that superficial ideological criticism of Orientalist arguments often leads to negative outcomes, rendering intellectual efforts futile. Orientalism does not



mean applying Western science to Eastern societies; it often exhibits a narrow perspective due to various reasons, including the social background and specific objectives of Orientalists. Some of them represent Western centrism, which limits their ability to innovate new methodological approaches within their field. Therefore, he did not approach his critique of Orientalism from an ideological standpoint or as an expert in the field of Oriental studies. Instead, he gradually moved from critiquing the reality to critiquing the stance of others towards this reality. His project aims to explain the reasons for the world's lag behind the progress of the West, rather than responding to Orientalism or defending oneself by attacking the other. This made his approach more objective as he focused on the deviations in understanding exhibited by Orientalists [18-19].

He did not reject Orientalism in its entirety, as he shares the intellectual foundations, ideas, and modern cultural values that Orientalists stand on. However, he differs from them in his approach to the topics and issues they address and write about. Despite not sharing their enthusiasm for their philological methods, he does intersect with them in utilizing the same intellectual schools, including the German historical school. Based on this, Abdullah Al-Arwi did not adopt an attacking position towards Orientalism out of a defensive instinct or to respond to Orientalists. Instead, his critique progressed from a scientific desire to better understand, political, and cultural history, and the lack of critical thinking in contemporary Arab thought and discourse on authenticity. This was a continuous motive for rarely influenced by implicit ideological biases. He sought to understand the methodological approaches of Orientalists in study history and assess their success. He also examined the impact of their Orientalist arguments in the field of studies, whether they were negative or positive, and their influence on their disciples and researchers. In contrast, who criticize the works of Orientalists for ideological purposes do not tend to reveal the methodological foundations of Orientalists for acceptance, rejection, or modification. They are content with selecting analyses and judgments based on their deviations, directly linking them conflict or political disputes. Therefore, they comprehend the knowledge assumptions upon which Orientalists build their research

without awareness, which adds to their arrogance [20-23].

He embarked on his criticism of scientific and objective curricula from an epistemological perspective in his attempt to dismantle the historical Orientalist view of the world. He criticized Orientalists for evaluating historians, arguing that they only focused on preserving the history law, neglecting the history of society and its non-Shariah-related aspects. On the other hand, Orientalists delved into the history of society in all its aspects. The problem with Orientalists lies in their belief that the history of preserving is the entirety of history, and that the Hadith methodology is the only method of acquiring knowledge. This implies that all other paths are either derivative or unrelated to it. He finds this unacceptable because historians distinguished between the history of as communities and the history. They placed the history of societies within the framework of general human history [24-25].

The error committed by thinkers in their criticism of Orientalism was also present among Orientalists themselves. They were unable to read the historical reality of the East as it exists in the East. They approached it from a normative standpoint, compressing the time distance between present methodologies and past events. Thus, the error does not lie in the methodologies themselves, but in how Orientalists applied them, unable to embody the critical spirit of their methodologies by considering the historical events of the past. This hindered a serious approach between the modernity of methodologies and our historical past [26]. The French Orientalist Maxime in the introduction of his book due to the negativity of his positions towards historical writing. He critically but profoundly criticized Orientalist knowledge, methodologies, and their theses, concluding that they were on the verge of disappearing as an independent field of study. Despite the awareness rejecting Orientalist knowledge, it affirms that the rejection is not due to isolation as claimed by the West but because there are ideas within Orientalism that call for such rejection [27-28].

He embarked on his criticism of Orientalism from a critical introduction that includes: "We must judge the Orientalists' criticism by comparing their achievements in this field. A fair judgment can only be made by comparing the results of both teams." Through this introduction, he reaches the conclusion that Orientalists



who are interested in studying historical composition, when studying history, use the same methodologies they use to study Western history. Consequently, they end up drawing a negative and inverse history that can be used for ideological purposes. He observes a significant difference between the methods Westerners use to read their history, such as the history of Rome and Greece, and the methods they use to read history. This difference between them reaches the point of contradiction. As a result, they approach the study of history from an ideological perspective. Despite the diversity of scientific methodologies, Orientalism did not move beyond the circle of traditional Orientalism, which was closely associated with the Church [29-30].

One of the prominent Orientalist approaches dedicated a part of his book to critique is the empirical method [31] and the positivist method [32]. He excluded the simplistic empirical method and the external positivist method because those who adopt the former delve deep into the culture they study, describing its details with utmost precision, while disregarding the historical dimensions of that culture [33]. Researchers following this method believe that what they see, experience, and describe through their senses is the absolute truth. On the other hand, the positivist method is criticized for its detachment from the studied culture and insistence on methodological detachment [34]. Consequently, it describes everything from an external perspective, comparing and classifying without paying attention to their origin and essence. It passes judgments using a value scale that it unquestionably relies on. The first methodology leads to subjective judgments, while the second results in superficial and rigid analyses. Both methodologies ignore history, leading to a lack of understanding of reality to the extent of alienation. This methodological error has also affected many Arab researchers due to their sympathetic approach towards reality without examining it within the context of history, which has led them to describe thought as superficial and simplistic [35].

His rejection of the positivist Orientalist method [36] adopted by Orientalists stems from the fact that this method relies on an abundance of "neutral documents" [37] that were originally created for social purposes, rather than mere documentation of events such as civil status records, commercial contracts, treaties, royal correspondences, and others. Since the positivist method

subjects non-material phenomena to materialism, it considers history as neutral documentation. However, history is an interpretive history that includes a collection of news and lacks neutral and original documents, except for a few, which do not provide the necessary solutions for researchers. Consequently, the critical analysis of Orientalists tends to go in two directions: either devising a research program that can never be implemented due to the lack of documents or acknowledging their incapacity. This is evident in the writings of Orientalists like Montgomery Watt [38] and Bernard Lewis [39]. In his study of the circumstances surrounding the emergence, Montgomery Watts writings consist of a series of assumptions, logical deductions, and imaginative scenarios that lead us to an attractive yet arbitrary conclusion. This was confirmed by Maxime Rodinson when he pointed out that the author uses unverified news or news open to multiple interpretations and subjective conclusions, on which he later builds new perspectives as if the initial ones represented established facts [40]. Therefore, the Orientalist often abandons issues supported by historical evidence found in his sources and replaces them with unsupported claims and allegations that lack scientific basis, except for their alignment with his bias against revelation. When he realizes this, he attempts to find scientific justifications. After arriving at certain conclusions, he admits the lack of a method to prove that this is what actually happened. It remains a mere assumption, but walking on the basis of such assumptions is part of the modern scientific approach [41]. Based on this premise, Watt worked on excluding what was mentioned in the most reliable narrations regarding the most well-known subjects among scholars [42].

He presented a plausible explanation for the establishment of the Abbasid Caliphate, linking it to social and economic transformations that affected internal social equilibrium, state revenues, and its financial situation. However, the absence of any historical evidence or support for this explanation renders it uncertain and therefore outside the realm of hypothetical and methodological approaches. As a result, the studies of Orientalists following the positivist method clash with their epistemic foundations, as they allow intuition and abstract inference to overcome scientific constraints [43].



He also criticizes the Orientalist Ignaz Goldziher [44] and his school of thought because they write a negative history and work to prove the impossibility of writing history according to their preferred approach, rejecting any alternative. However, there is no negative history except in contrast to positive history. Therefore, Goldziher's followers' criticisms do not negate the traditional narrative but ensure its survival to continue producing their studies. This is where the element of disdain and mockery emerges, resulting in futile studies from that school [45]. He mentions that Goldziher relied on the method of historical criticism and the comparative approach in his treatment of the emergence and evolution. This caused his studies to always lean towards using literary history without being a historian of literature itself. He rarely inclines towards direct observation but constantly delves into historical documents and texts, attempting to derive general judgments from them. His mistake lies in arming himself with preconceived ideas and judgments, attempting to manipulate the texts to prove the validity of those preconceived judgments, instead of allowing the texts to speak for themselves [46]. He adopted Goldziher's methodology in his study of hadith, as he turned to his study without adhering to Goldziher's methodology, thinking that he had found a solution and that his critical approach was more comprehensive and precise than the methodology of criticism and evaluation [47]. This deviation from the scientific method made the Orientalist unaware of the logic of hadith, turning his material into mere historical information with no distinction from other information. Thus, the great person indicates that Goldziher transformed the material of hadith into literary material in order to express his opinion about it. Afterwards, he opposes this opinion with the opinion of the preservationists, stating that the methodological error is not found in the initial transformation because it is possible and valid. Rather, the error lies in the twist and turning back, and the preservationist opposes this matter, as do others in different fields, because the problem touches upon the methodologies of humanities, failing to distinguish between matters of faith and secularism, or in other words, descriptive and normative approaches. Classic Orientalism aligns itself with hadith on one hand and summarizes the entirety of history in the history of preservation, while on the other hand, it aligns itself with literature. Goldziher applied the methodology of hadith

to material that he had turned into stories and anecdotes, as if the purpose of hadith was to teach people the manners of the world. Therefore, the rejection of preservationists of the Orientalist methodology is based on methodological considerations rather than fundamental or political motives [48].

From this perspective, he concludes that the series of failures that occurred among Orientalists who studied history can be attributed to the fact that they "never surpassed the level of abstract criticism, so they got lost in the details, becoming critics of language and preservers of traditions more than true historians" [49]. From this standpoint, he suggests that the structural imbalance in Orientalist thought is a result of the Orientalists' inability to abandon their Orientalist methodologies and the perspective through which they interpreted the reality of the Easterners. The preconceived ideas held by Orientalists about reality, as well as the selective trimming of the important from the unimportant, served the purposes of research determined by mental preconceptions that misled most Orientalists. Hence, the difference between reality and the perspective on reality becomes apparent, and the discrepancy between truth and reality is also evident [50].

He argues that the positivist approach erred in assessing the ancient historical documentation. This can be attributed to the ideological purposes that motivated Orientalists, who tended to underestimate it when compared to contemporary historical documentation. They also belittled it when compared to Roman and Greek historical documentation. This is clearly evident in the case of Orientalist Gronbaek, who mentioned in his book that "the concept of personality as conceived seems very limited when compared to the concept held by the Greeks and how they managed to depict all the features of historical personality to an underlying motivating force". From this, he affirms that what has obscured the Orientalists is due, in its essence, to two factors. Firstly, it is a kind of detachment that characterizes, somewhat resembling scientific objectivity. Secondly, it is the encyclopedic concern that leads to the concealment and obliteration of the author's personality [51-53].

In the previous text does not justify the mistakes and misrepresentations of Orientalists, but rather directs a structural critique to the Orientalist thought, which is responsible for relying on descriptions and narratives



transmitted to them to narrators in a manner that aligns with the ideological goals that constantly delete what does not align with the secular purpose of believing in a specific creed. The responsibility of Orientalism as a discipline lies in its failure to scrutinize the contradictory reports from local narrators, assuming that Orientalism is innocent of ideological goals that make the East a holistic entity. Therefore, his critique of Orientalism came through examining its errors and acknowledging the development of their thinking, which allowed them to delve into the complexities of our matters more accurately in order to present a neutral opinion that does not lean towards a particular agenda, so as not to be considered by the majority of the public as their biggest enemy [54].

Despite the criticism of Orientalist approaches, especially the positivist approach, he still believes that the positivist method sometimes "does not always lead to negative results, and in some cases, it may exceed the boundaries within which it usually confines itself." An example of this is Roger Blachère in his book. He applied the recommendations of the positivist approach and was able to extract new facts from a material known for its scarcity and repetition. This is considered a rare case in which the subject of study aligns with the adopted method. He attributes these positive results to Blachère's stance, which was not determined to produce negative results like other Orientalists [55].

The critique was not limited to these approaches only, but he also criticized the method of ethnology or cultural anthropology, which studies works as if they are detached from nature, i.e., complete detachment. It is based on two intertwined concepts: the concept of objective reason formulated by Hegel, which is the idea embodied in matter, such as saying that the Sphinx represents the Pharaonic mentality, and the concept of mental structure, which in Marxist theory corresponds to the economic and social structure. Both concepts do not align with the reality of Arab society. He believes that using the method of cultural anthropology reintroduces the Orientalist perspective into the pitfalls of researching culture and leads them to an unnatural future under the guise of difference and distinctiveness in standards, reducing their actual position and making them mere folklore or something similar [56-58].

In the context of his critique of the anthropological method, He directed his criticism towards the Orientalist Gustav von Grunebaum, stating that "his methodology

encompasses all the trends shared by Orientalism today, so his critique serves as a critique of many of those schools." Grunebaum is considered a distinguished scholar in the field of history, literature. [59-61]".

His critique of the anthropological discourse, which Grunebaum relies on, is due to its significant deficiency in providing a historical perspective on the studied phenomena. Relying on this method leads to definitive and essential results and judgments. When applied to a culture, this method portrays that culture as a closed system or pattern, where its values and manifestations are crystallized in fixed patterns or molds. This, in turn, leads to simplifications and exclusions that affect history in its dynamic and temporal sense [62] [63-67] [68].

Also, he rejected von Grunebaum's approach because it divides the cultural world into two realms: "the realm of true culture and the realm of folklore" - as defined by the culture that requires interpretation of its purposes and aesthetics. This idea was not limited to Westerners alone but was also adopted by many intellectuals who considered national culture to be synonymous with popular culture. This indicates their conformity to the West, from which they were influenced without realizing it. The purpose of dividing the world of culture into two realms indirectly encourages Western centrality, as the first world creates cultural products while the second world presents new raw materials filled with strangeness that may stimulate the imagination of Western intellectuals or provide new materials for creative work. This overlooks cultural differences, and thus the desire of social communities in culture to see culture differently, carried on the wings of a subsidiary desire, is a refusal to participate in universal civilization and its shared cultural values. It is an invitation to remain at the mercy of tradition, cultural backwardness, and excessive pride in authenticity [69-71].

Therefore, the content of the theory adopted by von Grunebaum revolves around denying the existence of distinction between different levels of expression, such as written literature and the tales of old women, for example. Consequently, it does not assign any special role to the intellectual. He realized that the methodology of anthropologists does not contain any degree of equality for non-Western cultures, despite their apparent enthusiasm for cultural differences; rather, it carries discrimination against them. This is what Al-Aroui



clarified when he said, "Therefore, I object to blending folklore with culture... as I see in it a contempt for our past and present [72]".

Grunebaum's writings revolve around comparing with other cultures such as Byzantine, Western Christianity, and Greco-Latin cultures, both in similarities and differences. According to Abdullah al-Aroui, Grunebaum's aim is to explore the subtle differences between them, rather than the points of similarity that are often repeated in discussions [73]. This is what we will try to highlight through his study of.

Grunebaum resorts to seeking the internal logic of through an external comparison with similar cultures, known as the quadrilateral comparison. This is a method takes from Grunebaum's approach, which involves juxtaposing the concurrence between elements of heritage and the contrast between similar elements derived from heritage and other cultures. He engages in "describing city in contrast to describing the ancient Greek city, then connecting the former to the concept of the nation, while linking the latter to the concept of Greek democracy, thereby revealing concurrence on one side and contrast on the other" [74]. If anything, this indicates that Grunebaum's methodology does not differ much from traditional Orientalism, which considered since its inception, to be associated with mechanisms that kept it rigidly confined within a copying nation, in contrast to the Greek civilization that, with its origins, has been linked to the mechanisms of democratic development representing the liberal West today. The goal of this comparison is to associate with the current backwardness of the and to associate present Western progress with the origins derived from the Greek city as the cradle of democracy in history. Although democracy was not exclusive to the Greeks, as ancient civilizations transferred it to them and later the civilization adopted and influenced it as well [75].

Another criticism of the Austrian Orientalist is that he also resorts to the comparison between three cultures that flourished in the same context: Byzantium (Rome), Western Christianity, Grunebaum indicates at this stage that the differences between them are superficial, meaning that they exist on the same level. This style of comparison aims to equalize cultures and any human group regardless of their level of advancement, whether advanced or backward. It seeks to equalize cultural expressions among all social groups in terms of value and

eliminate discrimination and preference between them. Through this approach, he believes that the concept of culture does nothing but deny the existence of transcendent meaning in culture. Thus, the goal of the Orientalist in this comparison is to "submerge all the distinctive features " but he realizes shortly after that the real goal is to focus on the importance of very subtle differences because they ultimately indicate the fundamental choice in the realm of values [76-77].

Regarding the contrasts between these cultures, Grunebaum highlights the difference between the advanced methods of the West and the backward beliefs of the world. He adopts the contemporary Western perspective as a criterion for determining the characteristics. He finds that the West does not need to scrutinize its culture because its openness and renewal are evident compared to the closed and stagnant culture of others. Through this approach, Grunebaum uses the West as a civilizational measure for the current status. He considers the West to have a dynamic culture while perceiving no movement in culture since its inception. This concept is incorrect because there are bright historical evidence and intellectual conflicts and social dynamics that cannot be denied. However, Grunebaum does not find in this evidence any indication of the transformation of history. He reduces the events of history to a frozen image that justifies the differences with the civilizational history. This indicates a lack of understanding by contemporary Western perspectives, which are the starting point for understanding and analysis. Therefore, we observe that the concept of the West, as a fundamental pillar in the process of approximation and perception, is not clear in Grunebaum's works. This is due to the difficulty of defining it as a heritage since it is still existing and evolving, unlike other rigid or self-contained cultures. This outcome is essentially the same as what Orientalists have reached [78-80].

Grunebaum fell into the trap of rigid Orientalist beliefs inherited from traditional Orientalism. Thus, the ultimate result of his study of is a historical view of constrained by the theoretical constraints of a culture that fails to do justice to existential truth or even examine the experiences of those who live within it. Consequently, Grunebaum portrays in the same way as the early European Orientalists did, relying on the image of the rigid rock or creed that disregards ordinary human



experience or the explicit dogma based on reductionism that does not change. Von Grunebaum has reduced the purpose to four characteristics: "non-anthropomorphism, transcendent truth, a gratifying self, or as the author expresses it, a submissive, serene personality, and finally, a taste that a person becomes accustomed to in all human affairs." The last characteristic is related to feeling and emotion, which does not contribute to understanding. As for the other three characteristics, they can be summarized in one concept: the supremacy or, to be more precise, choice and preference over humans in every aspect of life. This theoretical portrayal leads to many reductions and eliminations that the history as an eventful and dynamic discipline and historical research become victims [81-83].

Therefore, he considers that Grothendieck's approach reflects a general Orientalist view, in which is presented only as a typical intermediary model. It favors Allah over humans and equates his culture with Arab culture, which produces non-modern culture. This is in contrast to Western civilization, as according to Grothendieck, Western culture does not know decay. He states, [84]"The West will not die except as a result of an unexpected cosmic event or if it abandons its responsibilities.[85]"

Abdullah al-Arwi cites Grothendieck's objectivity when the Orientalist talks about the neutrality of the historian in his book "The of the Middle Ages." Grothendieck mentions that "the historian is neutral to the extent that for him, a grand palace and a catastrophe are equal.[86]" According to Grothendieck, exaggerated neutrality corresponds to imagination, and it is condemned when it is excessive or absent. In the case of the latter, failure becomes inevitable due to this absence. The concept of neutrality here combines the description of a grand palace and a catastrophe on the same level, which leads to a unified style and performance. In this non-human neutrality, which is suitable for a device that does not eliminate objectivity in favor of something we may call indifference, indifference, or a complete lack of what makes the narrator a historian.

Therefore, he criticizes the Orientalist's praise for what is called the neutrality of historians and responds by saying that objectivity here has a dual meaning. It is based either on the duty of testimony, which is a duty, and then neutrality becomes a recognition of divine wisdom, or it is about not confirming the reality's true

meaning because it belongs to the unseen. In this case, every event, no matter how important, must be recorded because the criterion for selection and the discovery of the hidden truth is missing [87].

Based on the previous information, we can see the convergence of different Orientalist approaches in one point, which is the restriction of society in its current situation. This restriction did not come about through agreement or the researcher's personal inclinations; rather, it is an inevitable result of the professional Orientalist's position. Due to this limitation, contemporary Orientalist methodologies used in studying history, such as philology, descriptive sociology, and structural analysis, are characterized by superficiality and are unable to understand the essence of the living society [88].

It should be noted that distinguishes between the accepted Orientalism and the rejected Orientalism. The first is represented by Western studies related to economic history, demographics, and industrial technological developments. The second Orientalism is characterized by philological excavation, and while the first is scientific in nature, the second yields ideological results. In order for this Orientalism to be appreciated and admired, two conditions must be met: first, the researcher must focus on investigation and meticulous examination to verify the accuracy and precision of the conclusions derived from the available information. During the time when imperialism was dominant, the research of Orientalists was used without their consent. The second condition revolves around keeping the study of Orientalism confined to the realm of literature and rejecting its inclusion in matters of creed. This is because the research of Orientalists in the 19th century used these topics for ideological purposes, aiming to cast doubt on themselves, their past, and their future. Consequently, it transformed from a neutral descriptive method explaining materialistic aspects into a critical, obstructive, and ineffective hostile approach that fails to achieve any positive benefit [89-90].

He mentions that the Orientalism that did not receive acceptance is Anglo-Saxon Orientalism, which inherited the philological traditions of German and French Orientalism. Despite its neutral and narrative language, the Arabs' rejection of this type of Orientalism stems from their critical stance towards it, which is not isolated from the context of this rejection. He confirms that these



Anglo-Saxon Orientalists, mostly Protestants, do not recognize the infallibility of the Pope. However, they used to claim that Christianity is an ongoing interpretive process carried out by Christians throughout the generations. From this perspective, their theory emerged regarding the connection of reform. On the other hand, their perception of the , as they call it, was fixed and not subject to real reform. Therefore, they portray as being in a dilemma with no way out, using it as a means of blackmail. They argue that adhering to the creed will lead to no development or progress under the guise of reform, which would ultimately result in the demise of traditional . [91-92].

He agrees with Edward Said that Orientalism, for the most part, is a construct resulting from Western perceptions of reality, rather than an objective discipline. He praised the modern Orientalist studies that emerged from individuals who remained loyal to the spirit of Orientalism, such as Masinyun. [93-95].

One issue worth noting is that the general historical framework in which he positions on the West and the Western cultural project were formed relates to the post-independence era of countries and their attempts to rid themselves of the effects of European domination. His works during this period aimed to establish a distinction between colonial Europe and the European epistemic project. However, he does not see any contradiction in working to confront the remnants of the colonial phenomenon and simultaneously benefiting from the gains of the Western project in the realm of thought, scientific knowledge, and technology. He goes even further when he considers that transcending Europe through criticism can only be achieved after a historical assimilation of the various gains produced by Europe throughout its history [96].

Based on this, we can see the difference in he perspective on the West and the Western historical project compared to his perspective on Orientalism. They were formed through the same historical thinking mechanisms, which he used to analyze thought and society, including objective historical and political understanding and rational comprehension. In his writings, he worked to produce a defensive discourse about modernity and reform, calling to learn from the gains of contemporary Western thought. Therefore, he does not view the achievements of modern history as solely belonging to Western Europe. Person recognizes that his political

battle with the West should not make him overlook the importance of the comprehensive intellectual and civilizational project as a whole [97].

Conclusions

The famous person critiquing Orientalism from an academic perspective. In his critique of Orientalist thought, he focused on the Orientalist methodologies used in studying Gulf heritage. These methodologies are centered around Europe and are influenced by certain explicit or implicit ideological purposes, such as defending authenticity, identity, and triumphing over the negative legacy of Orientalism. Through his critique, person aimed to clarify the level of knowledge related to Orientalism and challenge the assumptions and conclusions that may seem biased due to ideological influences. However, he views the Western historical project differently from his view of Orientalism. The person attributes this stance to the need for updating and developing the methodologies and approaches used in studying important heritage.

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